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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Cases in this latter area present no problem as to reviewability
of the final orders of the full boards or commissions, such orders
being subject to review in Article 78 proceedings.12  However, a
definite problem exists where an intermediary is given power to
either dismiss petitions, or forward them for full hearings. A ques-
tion naturally arises as to the finality (for purposes of Section 298)
of such a dismissal order by this intermediary, insofar as final orders
have been deemed the only ones subject to judicial review.
The decision in the instant case must turn on whether the dis-
missal of the petition as affirmed by the commission chairman was
a final determination 13 by the Commission for the purposes of Sec-
tion 298. Petitioner filed his verified complaint pursuant to Section
297 with the Commission and not with an individual commissioner.
Thus it would seem any determination given him is in effect a deter-
mination of the Commission, despite the fact that an individual com-
missioner personally dismissed the complaint by letter. Petitioner
pursued all the remedies available to him under the internal pro-
cedures adopted by the Commission. 4 As far as the agency was
concerned, it terminated the matter. Nevertheless, it has been held,
that absent express legislative prohibition, there is inherent power in
the courts to review the exercise of discretion or the abuse thereof
by an administrative agency performing a quasi-judicial function.1 5
Under the strict construction of the Court, it would seem that the
action of a single commissioner, regardless of how arbitrarily ren-
dered, would not be subject to appeal, since it would not be a
final order.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT - PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION - RE-
CORDED CONVERSATION HELD NOT PRIVILEGED. - An action was
brought to restrain a New York Legislative Committee from divulg-
ing publicly the contents of a secretly recorded, private conversation
between an attorney and his client. The plaintiffs claim that under
12 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1285(3) provides that review is unavailable of
those determinations which do not finally determine the rights of the parties.
13 Such dismissal as affirmed by the commission chairman is, as to the
petitioner, a final determination within the spirit of Article 78 of the New
York Civil Practice Act though not, as the Court ruled, within the strict
construction of Section 298.
14Rules Governing Practise and Procedure before the State Commission
Against Discrimination, 4 N.Y. CONsOLmATED LAWS SERVICE (Supp. 1957,
p. 60).1 5 See, e.g., Marburg v. Cole, 286 N.Y. 202, 36 N.E.2d 113 (1941) ; Marko-
•witz v. Moss, 29 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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RECENT DECISIONS
Section 353 of the New York Civil Practice Act this consultation
was privileged and therefore could not be disclosed. The Court of
Appeals held that Section 353 is applicable only when the attorney
or client is called to testify as a witness and not when disclosure is
effected through an outside agency. Lanza v. New York State Joint
Legis. Comm., 3 N.Y.2d 92, 143 N.E.2d 772 (1957).
It is a basic rule of evidence that evidence of whatever facts are
logically relevant to the issue is legally admissible and must be brought
forth,1 except as it may be excluded by some specific rule or principle
of law.2 One such exception is the ancient common-law rule .which
forbids an attorney from disclosing confidential communications made
to him by his client.4  Section 353 of the Civil Practice Act 5 is a
codification of that common-law rule.6
The privilege of non-disclosure is limited "to an, examination
of a person as a witness unless the provisions thereof are expressly
waived upon the trial or examination by the.., client." 7 In Matter
of Cunnion,s the testimony of an attorney was properly rejected pur-
suant to Section 835 of the Code of Civil Procedure (predecessor of
'Bird v. United States, 180 U.S. 350 (1901); Torrey v. Congress Square
Hotel Co., 145 Me. 234, 75 A2d 451 (1950); Miller v. Trans Oil Co., 18
N.J. 407, 113 A2d 777 (1955).
2E.g., N.Y. Civ. PnAc. Act §§ 349 (husband-wife), 351 (clergyman-
penitent), 352 (patient-physician) ; In re Ryman, 139 Pa. Super. 212, 11 A.2d
677 (1940) (hearsay rule).
3 See 8 WIGuoRE, EvDENcE § 2290 (3d ed. 1940) for a history of the
privilege. See also Opinion 150, OPINIONS OF THE A.B.A. CoMmrrnm ON
PROFESSIONAL ETics AND Gxmvxczs 313, 315 (1956), which states that
the privilege was first applied in Berd v. Lovelace, Cary (Eng.) 88 (1577) ;
Louisell, The Psychologist in TodaVs Legal World, Part II, 41 MINN. L.
R1E. 731, 737-38 (1957).
4 See Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. (N.Y.) 528, 596 (1848);
RicHAWsox, EvxDENcE § 426 (8th ed. 1955); 8 WiacoaE, EvmENcE § 2290
(3d ed. 1940)'; Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Comntnnication Between
Lawyer and Client, 16 CALtr. L. REv. 487 (1928). The foundation for the rule
is the "orderly administration of justice by insuring frank revelation by the
client to the attorney without fear of a forced disclosure; in other words, to
promote freedom of consultation." People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of
County Jail, 150 Misc. 714, 717, 270 N.Y. Supp. 362, 367 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
without opinion, 242 App. Div. 611, 271 N.Y. Supp. 1059 (1st Dep't 1934);
cf. Morgan, Suggested Remedy For Obstructions To Expert Testimony By
Rules Of Evidence, 10 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 285, 288-90 (1943).
6 "An attorney or counselor at law shall not be allowed to disclose a
communication, made by his client to him, or his advice given thereon, in
the course of his professional employment, nor shall any clerk, stenographer,
or other person employed by such attorney or counselor be allowed to dis-
close any such communication or advice given thereon." N.Y. Cirv. Pa Ac.
AcT § 353. See 8 WIGMoaRE, Ev-mIEcE § 2292 n.2 (3d ed. 1940) for a com-
pilation of states which have adopted similar statutes.
GKing v. Ashley, 179 N.Y. 281, 72 N.E. 106 (1904) (per curiam);
Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 128 N.Y. 420, 28 N.E. 651 (1891); Matter of Austin,
42 N.Y. 516 (1886); RMcH.ARsoN, EvImDEcE §426 (8th ed. 1955).7 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 354 (emphasis added).8 201 N.Y. 123, 94 N.E. 648 (1911).
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Section 354).9 Similarly, the production of confidential medical rec-
ords relating to the diagnosis and treatment of patients could not be
required of a physician,10 who is accorded the same statutory recog-
nition as an attorney."
Since the prohibition regarding a confidential communication is
not directed against the testimony of a third person, there is no reason
for excluding the testimony of such persons. The doctrine is well
settled that a person who overhears a conversation between an at-
torney and his client, whether by design or accident, and with or
without their knowledge, may testify as to what he has heard, al-
though the communication may be, as between the parties them-
selves, one of a confidential nature.1 2 In Hurlburt v. Hurlburt,13 for
example, it was held that the prohibition does not apply to a case
where two or more persons consult an attorney for their mutual
benefit in any litigation which may thereafter arise among them, but
that it does apply in a litigation between them and strangers. 14 In
People v. Buchanan,15 the presence of a third party, who was not the
agent of the attorney or client, completely destroyed the confidential
nature of the communication. 16
A federal court likewise recognized this third party rule where
an accountant was present at a consultation between an attorney and
his client. 17 The communication was not deemed privileged because
his presence was not indispensable in order for the communiqu6 to
be made to the attorney, in the sense that the presence of a counsel's
secretary might be.18
If privileged communications are not protected from deliberate
attempts to intercept them, the immunity conferred on them will be
readily circumvented. A premium would be set upon theft, trickery
or other artifice to gain knowledge of an attorney's communication
to his client. It seems that the Court unnecessarily resorted to, and
extended, the third party rule to include a concealed electric device.
'When Sections 353 and 354 of the Civil Practice Act are properly
9 Matter of Cunnion, 201 N.Y. 123, 129, 94 N.E. 648, 650 (1911) (emphasis
added).ad New York City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940).
See also Buffalo Loan, Trust and Safe Co. v. Knights Templar and Masonic
Mut. Aid Ass'n, 126 N.Y. 450, 27 N.E. 942 (1891).11 New York City Council v. Goldwater, supra note 10.
12 See Cary v. White, 59 N.Y. 336 (1874); Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 633,
22 Pac. 26 (1889); Hoy v. Morris, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 519 (1859); Clark
v. State, 159 Tex. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339 (1953) ; 8 WIGuom, EvrDENCE § 2326
(3d ed. 1940) for rationale of the rule.
13 128 N.Y. 420, 28 N.E. 651 (1891).
'
4 Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 128 N.Y. 420, 28 N.E. 651 (1891).
15 145 N.Y. 1, 39 N.E. 846 (1895).
21OPeople v. Buchanan, 145 N.Y. 1, 39 N.E. 846 (1895).
1 Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 860 (1949).
'sIbid. See also Livezey v. United States, 279 Fed. 496 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 260 U.S. 721 (1922).
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read conjointly, it appears that the instant case is not one of testi-
monial compulsion and should have been decided on that ground.
It is submitted that legislation should be enacted to bring the
testimony of any witness disclosing a communication between a lawyer
and his client within the sweep of the attorney-client privilege, if it
came to the knowledge of such witness in a manner not reasonably
to be anticipated by the client.
CITIZENS AND CITIZENSHIP - NATURALIZATION - EXEMPTION
FROM MILITARY SERVICE OATH ON BASIS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
UPHELD.-An alien seeking naturalization petitioned to be exempted
from taking the military service oath. He claimed to fulfill the statu-
tory requirement of being opposed to service by reason of "religious
training and belief." Although it was found that his belief was not
based on any "religious training," the District Court granted the
petition holding that petitioner need show only that his beliefs are in
relation to a Supreme Being. In re Hansen, 148 F. Supp. 187
(D. Minn. 1957).
Before being admitted to citizenship, an alien is required by the
Immigration and Nationality Act' to take an oath in open court.
Petitioner seeks the conscientious objector exemption provided by the
Act which would excuse him from swearing to perform military
service and would require him to swear only "to perform work of
national importance under civilian direction when required by law." 2
Conscientious objection is now recognized under both the Universal
Military Training and Service Act and the Immigration and National-
ity Act.3 The definition of a conscientious objector is the same in
both: a person who by reason of "religious training and belief" is
opposed to any type of service in the armed forces. Further, the term
lImmigration and Nationality Act §337(a), 66 STAT. 258, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1448(a) (1952).2 Ibid.
3 Prior to 1946, conscientious objectors could not become naturalized citizens
since it was held that the oath of allegiance required, as a prerequisite to
naturalization, that petitioner promise to bear arms in defense of the United
States. United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931); United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Schwimmer. 279 U.S. 644
(1929). At that time the oath read: ' . . that he will support and defend
the Constitution and Laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign
and domestic and bear true faith and allegiance to the same." 34 STAT. 598
(1906). These cases were overruled by United States v. Girouard, 328 U.S. 61
(1946), which changed the accepted meaning of the oath so as to exclude the
promise to bear arms in defense of this country. The act was amended in 1950
to read substantially as it does today. See note 1 supra.
